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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah Municipality, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Jurisd 
Court of Appeals Case 
No. 20030212-CA 
iction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G)(2003). 
Issues and Standard of Review 
Is an employment claim against a government entity, which sounds in 
contract, exempt from the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003)? This issue was raised 
and preserved in briefing before the District Court. (R. at 28-36.) 
This issue involves the interpretation of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et seq. A matter of statutory construction is a 
1 
question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See. Taqhipour v. Jerez. 2002 
UT 74,^18, 52 P.3d 1252. 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
This case is determined by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003), which 
states: 
Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-10-19. 
Statement of the Case 
This case comes to the Court of Appeals as a result of the district court's 
dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court 
determined that Plaintiff had not provided notice under the Governmental 
Immunity Act and could not, therefore, proceed. This appeal follows. 
Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant Layton City. Plaintiff, in her 
complaint, alleged that she was constructively terminated in violation of the 
Defendant's written policy manual and in violation of her contractual rights of 
2 
good faith and fair dealing. Because Plaintiff's complaint sounded exclusively in 
contract, compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 
has been waived by the plain terms of the Act itself. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
5(1). 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff was constructively terminated from her employment at Layton City 
on 2 July 2001. She had been employed for fourteen years as a police 
dispatcher. 
2. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on 14 March 2002 in the Second Judicial District 
Court for Davis County, Case No. 020800412. 
3. Defendant removed the case to Federal Court asserting that Plaintiff was 
attempting to assert an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. No 
such cause of action pleaded or attempted. Ultimately, the United States 
District Court dismissed the removed case since there was no basis for 
federal jurisdiction. 
4. After the case was dismissed, Plaintiff immediately refiled her complaint in 
Second District Court for Davis County, Case no. 020700620. Exhibit B. 
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After Plaintiff filed its new complaint, Defendant moved to dismiss the case 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to comply with the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This was the first 
time Defendant had raised such an issue. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that she was terminated in violation of an 
employment contract, as contained in Defendant's policy manual. Plaintiff 
also alleged that her constructive termination was in violation the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Exhibit B, Complaint. 
After briefing1, the District Court, without issuing any memorandum 
decision, and without informing Plaintiff, ruled in favor of Defendant and 
granted the Motion to Dismiss. The court's decision was communicated 
solely to Defendant's counsel by the court clerk. The mechanism of 
communication is evidenced by the cover letter Defendant's counsel 
submitted to Plaintiff with the draft order. See Exhibit C. 
Significantly, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss and memorandum citing 
to a number of Utah immunity cases, virtually all of which were tort cases. 
Defendant did not cite or analyze the contract provision of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition, conversely, raised the 
contract provision and provided analysis. Defendant filed no reply memorandum 
to Plaintiff's briefing and thus, provided the trial court with no contrary analysis 
and did not preserve any counterarguments in the record. 
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8. No notice of the court's decision was ever provided by the Court to Plaintiff 
or Plaintiffs counsel. 
9. The Court entered the Order prepared by Defendant on 19 February 2003, 
from which Plaintiff timely appeals. Exhibit A. 
Summary of Argument 
Plaintiff was constructively terminated from her employment with Defendant 
Layton City. Following her termination, Plaintiff sued the city for breach of its 
contractual obligations. Under the plain language of the Governmental Immunity 
Act, immunity was waived for Plaintiff's claim and compliance with the terms of 
the Act was also waived. The district court's determination -without analysis-
that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Governmental Immunity Act was 
incorrect as a matter of law. The statutory language is clear, as are the decisions 
of courts interpreting it. Plaintiff's claims should be allowed to proceed. The 
district court's decision should be reversed and this matter remanded for further 
proceedings. 
5 
Argument 
I. Under the Plain Language of the Utah Government Immunity Act, 
Plaintiff Was Not Required to Comply with Statutory Notice 
Requirements. 
Plaintiffs complaint sounds in contract. Her claims are for a constructive 
termination in violation of the Defendant's written policy manual and the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. A contract claim could not be more clearly stated. 
Claims against municipalities, including contract claims, are subject to the terms 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-1, et seq. 
(2003). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (2003) provides for a general claim of 
immunity, subject to the exceptions detailed in the Act: "Except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function..." 
The Act contains numerous areas of the law for which sovereign immunity 
is waived. For example, the Act waives immunity for actions involving possession 
or title to real or personal property. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 (2003). The Act 
waives immunity for certain cases of negligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-7, 
63-30-10 (2003). The Act also waives immunity from suit in actions involving 
injuries sustained from unsafe public roads and buildings. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-30-8, 63-30-9 (2003). As to each of the foregoing sections, however, 
6 
persons desirous of pursuing a claim against a governmental entity must still 
comply with the notice requirements set forth in the Act. 
Contract claims are different. The Act provides, "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligations. Actions arising 
out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003).2 Under this section, immunity from suit is waived 
as to any actions against governmental entities sounding in contract. 
Significantly, not only is sovereign immunity waived by §63-30-5(1), but 
compliance with all of the notice and claim provisions contained in the Act is also 
waived. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "Governmental Immunity Act 
must be strictly applied." See, Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections. 2001 UT 
34,1J14, 24 P.3d 958. (Citations omitted.) Statutes should also be construed to 
"evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the 
plain language of the Act,'" and courts should "avoid interpretations that will 
2The only exception to the waiver of actions sounding in contract involves 
the Division of Water Resources under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (2) and is not 
applicable to the case at bar. 
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render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." jd. at 1J15. (Citations 
omitted.) The District Court's decision reads Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) out of 
the Act and is therefore improper. 
Given the numerous diverse areas in which the Act waives immunity or 
compliance with the notice provisions of the Act, the proper analytical framework 
would include: (1) A consideration of the claim, as set forth in the Complaint, 
without reference to the Act or any governmental entity to determine the actual 
nature of the claim asserted, i.e., contract, negligence, property, etc.; (2) a 
categorization of the claim as actually asserted; (3) a review of the Act to see 
whether immunity has been waived and whether compliance with the Act has 
been waived; and (4) an application of the plain terms of the Act to the actual 
claim. It is essential to the proper application of the Act to engage in a clear, 
deliberative analysis to categorize, analyze, and determine governmental 
immunity claims. See, Camas Colorado, Inc. v. Board of County Commr's. 36 
P.2d 135, 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)(holding that, under Colorado's immunity act, 
courts should analyze the claim itself and determine, based upon a classification 
of the claim, whether governmental immunity applies). The record fails to reveal 
that the trial court engage in any such deliberation. 
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Other courts have demonstrated the proper analysis. For example, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed a claim for unpaid wages, determined 
that such claim arose from a contractual right, and that therefore, sovereign 
immunity was waived under an immunity statute similar to Utah's. Paquette v. 
County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715, 718 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). In another case, a 
court concluded that a claim for money had and received, based upon a faulty 
civil forfeiture, sounded in contract for immunity analysis purposes. Karpierz v. 
Easlev. 31 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
In this matter, the district court engaged in no such analysis and made no 
findings, instead making the bald assertion, "The claims plaintiff has asserted in 
her Complaint dated November 25, 2002, are barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act."3 (See. Exhibit A, jf2.) This conclusion is unsupported by the 
evidence and is incorrect as a matter of law. Analysis of the claims presented in 
Plaintiff's Complaint dictates the opposite outcome on this question. The 
3lt is significant to note that Plaintiff/Appellant did not have the benefit of 
even knowing the district court had made a decision. In a strange procedure, the 
district court informed Defendant's counsel of its decision. The only notice 
Plaintiff had of the decision was the draft copy of the order sent out by 
Defendant's counsel. See Letter, Exhibit C. While there is was no actual 
impropriety here, it is difficult to explain to non-lawyers that such a procedure is 
fair and transparent. Such an approach is certainly ill-advised and fairly raises 
the appearance of impropriety to litigants and the public. 
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Complaint makes specific contractually based allegations regarding Plaintiffs use 
of sick leave, accounting for hours, and other contractual matters. (See. Exhibit 
B, 1ffi 4-11 •) The Complaint alleges that Defendant violated its own written 
personnel policies, which have contractual significance, in its treatment of 
Plaintiff. (See. Exhibit B, 1T1P2-13,17.) The Complaint also alleges that given the 
policy, Plaintiff was treated unfairly, thus implicating the city's contractual 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. (See. Exhibit B, ^|17.) Finally, Plaintiff's 
Complaint sought damages that were contractual in nature. Indeed, Plaintiff 
made no tort claims whatsoever against the Defendant. Its only claims were 
related to Plaintiffs contractual relationship with Layton City. (See. Exhibit B.) 
Given the nature of Plaintiff's claims, there is only one possible conclusion 
under the plain language of the Government Immunity Act. Plaintiffs' cause of 
action sounds in contract. Therefore, Utah has waived immunity, as well as 
waived any need for Plaintiff to comply with the notice requirements demanded of 
other claimants under the Governmental Immunity Act. Any other interpretation 
would render the notice waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) 
superfluous and inoperative. The district court erred in so doing; its decision 
should be reversed and this matter remanded. 
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II. Court Interpretation of Governmental Immunity Supports Plaintiff's 
Interpretation of the Statute. 
Utah's appellate courts have regularly faced issues related to the 
Governmental Immunity Act. In their decisions, these courts have recognized 
that Utah has waived immunity for contractual obligations, including the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See. Brown v. Moore. 973 P.2d 950, 954 
(Utah 1998); Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 563-64 and n.18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Utah Appellate Courts have explicitly noted that suits arising against 
governmental entities, like Layton City, arising out of contract do not need to be 
preceded by the notice provisions otherwise applicable under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. See, Neilson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Recently, this Court concluded that a passenger injured while riding in a 
State-owned automobile was entitled to assert a claim without satisfying the 
notice and claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. See. Neel v. 
State. 854 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court concluded that the 
passenger/plaintiff was the third party beneficiary of the State's "contractual" 
obligation to provide PIP benefits as a self-insurer. ]d. See, Stewart ex rel. 
Womack v. City of Jackson. 804 So.2d 1041, 1044 (Miss. 2002)(similar holding 
under arising from third party beneficiary analysis). In another matter, the Utah 
11 
Supreme Court concluded that §63-30-5 governed an unsigned contract for a 
right-of-way. See, Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 
1241,1248 (Utah 1990). In that case, the court concluded that even though the 
city did not sign the contract, by accepting the grant and paying for an easement, 
the city entered into a contract. The Court concluded that the contract waiver 
provision of §63-30-5 applied even though the easement was for flood control 
purposes, id. It is clear that cases brought before the courts sounding in contract 
have been consistently held to be governed by § 63-30-5. 
Indeed, those cases where the courts have held notice requirements to be 
an issue are distinguishable from the case subjudice. For example, in Hall, a 
Utah Department of Corrections officer settled a claim relating to his treatment 
while employed, an allegedly unlawful demotion. He received a payment for this 
settlement. Hall, at fi3. Subsequently, he resigned from the department and 
alleged that the department had made disparaging reports about him to 
prospective employers, which prevented him from obtaining employment, id. at 
1|5. The court concluded that these tort based claims were subject to the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. id. at ffl[21-26. This Court took a 
similar approach in Broadbent v. Board of Education of Cache County, 910 P.2d 
12 
1274, 1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), disposing of Plaintiff's tort claims because of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
There is also support for Plaintiff's position in case law from other 
jurisdictions. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. 918 P.2d 7 
(N.M. 1996), is one such example. New Mexico, like Utah, has a general 
statutory scheme creating governmental immunity. In addition, New Mexico has 
an exception to the rule established in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-23, through which 
the state has waived immunity from suit for actions based on written contracts. 
Garcia, like the instant matter, involved a dispute over violations of a 
government's entities written employment policies. See. Garcia. 918 P.2d at 9. 
The governmental entity challenged the suit arguing that it was immune because 
of sovereign immunity. However, the court held that the nature of the defendant's 
policies, created an implied employment contract, which fell squarely under the 
statutory exception. ]d. at 11-13. 
Harris v. State Personnel Bd.. 216 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Ct. App. 1985), is 
another example. California's Tort Claims Act establishes immunity from suit, 
and contains notice requirements similar to those in Utah's code. ]d. at 276. 
However, like Utah, contract actions are expressly exempted from California's 
immunity scheme by Cal. Gov't. Code §814. id. In Harris, a state employee 
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brought a claim based on his termination and appeal rights, jd. at 275. The 
Harris court noted that the Tort Claims Act excluded actions arising on contract, 
and noted that the plaintiff's dispute, centered in his employment contract, did not 
sound in tort, and was therefore exempt from statutory notice requirements, jd. at 
276. 
A similar example is Tennyson v. School District of Menomonie Area. 606 
N.W.2d 594 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). In Tennyson, a governmental employee 
claimed she was constructively terminated. The governmental agency claimed 
that the constructive termination claim was a tort claim masquerading as a 
contract claim. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected this argument out of 
hand, holding that a constructive termination sounded in contract and therefore 
governmental immunity was waived under Wisconsin's immunity statute, id. at 
602 n.9. Even when a claim would support both a contract and a tort claim, at 
least one court has held that only the tort claim is governed by a state immunity 
statute which waives immunity for contract but not tort claims. Koeniq v. City of 
South Haven. 597 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. 1999). 
Like Garcia, Harris, and Tennyson, the instant matter is a cause of action 
centered on Plaintiffs rights under her employment contract as contained in 
Defendant's written policies. Like New Mexico, California and Wisconsin, Utah 
14 
expressly excludes contractual obligations from its governmental immunity 
scheme. Other states have reached the same conclusion. CSXTransp.. Inc. v. 
City of Garden City. 325 F.3d 1236,1242 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003)(holding Georgia had 
waived sovereign immunity for contract claims); J.P. Asset Co.. Inc. v. City of 
Wichita. 70 P.3d 711, 715 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003)(holding that only a tort claimant, 
not a contract claimant, need comply with the notice requirements Kansas' 
immunity act). Causes of action against governmental entities based on 
employment contracts are excluded from the Governmental Immunity Act's 
scope, and any notice requirements are waived. 
Since the Governmental Immunity Act squarely waives immunity for 
contract claims and squarely waives compliance with the notice and claim 
provisions of the Act, Plaintiff was not required to provide any notice or claim prior 
to filing her complaint. Defendant's invocation of the Act was baseless. The trial 
court's determination was erroneous. The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs 
complaint should therefore be reversed and this case remanded. 
15 
III. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Should Be Liberally Construed 
in This Case 
While Utah's appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act must be strict, the Act itself should be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes. The Act clearly expresses an intent to not 
require compliance with the notice requirements for "any contractual obligation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1 )(2003). This intent should be broadly and liberally 
construed to effectuate the Legislature's purpose in modifying the common law. 
"It is generally true that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act expanded 
government liability." Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 351 
(Utah 1989). The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was therefore in derogation 
of the common law. By legislative action, Utah has rejected the canon of 
interpretation that provides that statutes in derogation of the common law are to 
be strictly construed; the statutes of the state of Utah are to be liberally 
construed with a view to accomplishment of the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2003). This section was expressly 
intended to abrogate the common law rule of strict construction of statues which 
are in derogation of the common law. See In Re Garr's Estate, 86 P. 757, 761 
(Utah 1906). 
16 
Under this case, the contract provision of the immunity act, § 63-30-5(1), 
should be liberally construed. Camas Colorado. 36 P.3d at 138. In this case, the 
trial court applied the statute so narrowly as to ignore its express provisions 
relating to contracts. Assuming the trial court analyzed the nature of the Plaintiff's 
claims, as contained in the complaint, its analysis was so crabbed and unsparing 
that it violated the rule that statutes in derogation of the commonly law are to be 
liberally construed. The trial court's decision -there was no analysis- was 
erroneous. It should be reversed. 
Conclusion 
Under the plain language of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
immunity is waived for claims arising out of the state's contractual obligations. 
Plaintiff filed claims against Layton City based on her employment contract with 
the city. These claims are wholly permissible under the Governmental Immunity 
Act, and because of their contractual nature, are exempt from the notice and 
claim requirements of the act. Moreover, the Act should, in this respect, be 
liberally construed to effectuate the Legislative purpose of allowing contract 
claims to proceed without compliance with the notice and claim provisions of the 
Act. Only this analysis is faithful to the terms of the Act. The decision of the 
17 
District Court should be reversed and this case remanded for further 
proceedings.. 
DATED this }{ day of hM , 2003. 
Stevenson & Smith , P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
By: 
Brad C. Smith 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1/ day of July, 2003, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
the following: 
Camille Johnson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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Exhibit A 
Findings and Order 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFJJELD, FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 020700620 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, J u d S e Michael G. Allphin 
Defendant. 
The Court, having reviewed defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support, together with plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss, and being fully advised in the matter hereby finds: 
1. Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Claim against Layton City pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act; and 
2. The claims plaintiff has asserted in her Complaint dated November 25, 2002, are 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
e* A 
Based upon the foregoing findings, this Court hereby orders plaintiffs Con- plaint 
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this j ^ day of _ 
_,2003. 
B^THE COURT: 
STATE OFUTAH \ e c 
COUNTY OF DAVIS J s s 
I HEREBY CERTIFY "P-^TTI q K t TP | iF r^y rc T ur ^ 
ORIGINAL ON R L 
. O f , 
DATED THi 
ALYSON 
•^m> c0O tib ' ^ f f a e l a A I ( P h m 
H,oCr &V U<7 . ^ ^ ^ A c t court Judge 
- DEPUTY 
J 
N \I360-A520\Plead.ngs\O2070O62O\Fmdings and Order 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS AND 
ORDER was served on the parties listed below by first class mail, postage prepaid, this ^ £ — " 
day of January, 2003. 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Complaint 
Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
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MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge: 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains 
and alleges of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE 
1. Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, Ttate of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled 
court. 
e« s 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fo] 
Defendant, Layton City. Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had 
been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13) 
years . During that period of time she was a police 
dispatcher. Approximately six months prior to the 
termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under 
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. 
Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work 
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and 
stressful environment, in an airea that is already stress 
ridden. 
On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work to take her daughter t 
the doctor's office. Plaintiff reported said hours on her 
time sheet. 
Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best 
not to go back to work until Lt. Moyes had returned and we 
could resolve the situation. Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyi 
on Monday morning, June 11th, and he had asked if Plaintiff 
should be alright until he got back. Plaintiff thought sh 
would. 
On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and 
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled 
for the next day. 
Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed 
be at work. Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m. When 
Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked 
if she needed to leave. Plaintiff said if she could skip 
lunch and go home early it would be better. Lisa said she 
would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief. 
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t 
lunch. Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not going home 
early. 
10. In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone 
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the 
basketball camp that morning. (She has had other ankle 
injuries). 
11. At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff 
she could leave. Plaintiff was surprised. Plaintiff was 
walking out the door and Lisa said she would need a doctor's 
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early. 
12. Prior to these incidents, in December, 2000, after being 
Plaintiff's supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa Murdock 
demanded that Plaintiff provide medical documentation of 
sick leave used at that time. Plaintiff did not provide 
said documentation, although she had it, because she felt 
that it was an improper deviation from existing City policy. 
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, 
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the 
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject to any 
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
has been treated differently from and more severely than 
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of 
Defendant's specific written policy. 
14. Officers, employees, agents or servants of Defendant 
confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had 
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resLg 
from the City or face termination. Because of her fear tha 
a termination would preclude her from obtaining future 
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against 
her will accepted termination. 
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that other employees of City have been subject to 
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other 
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or 
similar allegations. 
16. Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges 
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as 
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an 
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings, 
probation, and other punishment. 
17. Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that 
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged. Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its 
termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as 
follows: 
1. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy. 
3. For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may 
be allowed by law. 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this day of November, 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah 84067 
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January 30,2003 
VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
Honorable Judge Michael G. Allphin 
District Court Judge 
Second District Court 
P.O. Box 769 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Re: Machelle Canjxeld v. Layton City 
Case No, Case No. 020700620 
Dear Judge Allphin: 
Pursuant to a request from Terry in your office, we submit the enclosed Findings and 
Order for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Canuil/N. Johpson 
CNJ/cah 
Enclosure 
cc: Brad C. Smith 
Gary Crane 
James Fisher 
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMLLE N JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone- (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 020700620 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, Jud&e Michael G. Allphin 
Defendant, 
The Court, having reviewed defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support, together with plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss, and being fully advised in the matter hereby finds: 
1. Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Claim against Layton City pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act; and 
2. The claims plaintiff has asserted in her Complaint dated November 25,2002, are 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, this Court hereby orders plaintiffs Complaint 
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this day of , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael G. Allphin 
District Court Judge 
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